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Attribute-Based Encryption With Verifiable
Outsourced Decryption
Junzuo Lai, Robert H. Deng, Chaowen Guan, and Jian Weng
Abstract—Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a public-key-
based one-to-many encryption that allows users to encrypt and
decrypt data based on user attributes. A promising application
of ABE is flexible access control of encrypted data stored in the
cloud, using access polices and ascribed attributes associated with
private keys and ciphertexts. One of the main efficiency drawbacks
of the existing ABE schemes is that decryption involves expensive
pairing operations and the number of such operations grows with
the complexity of the access policy. Recently, Green et al. proposed
an ABE system with outsourced decryption that largely elimi-
nates the decryption overhead for users. In such a system, a user
provides an untrusted server, say a cloud service provider, with
a transformation key that allows the cloud to translate any ABE
ciphertext satisfied by that user’s attributes or access policy into a
simple ciphertext, and it only incurs a small computational over-
head for the user to recover the plaintext from the transformed
ciphertext. Security of an ABE system with outsourced decryption
ensures that an adversary (including a malicious cloud) will not be
able to learn anything about the encrypted message; however, it
does not guarantee the correctness of the transformation done by
the cloud. In this paper, we consider a new requirement of ABE
with outsourced decryption: verifiability. Informally, verifiability
guarantees that a user can efficiently check if the transformation
is done correctly. We give the formal model of ABE with verifiable
outsourced decryption and propose a concrete scheme. We prove
that our new scheme is both secure and verifiable, without relying
on random oracles. Finally, we show an implementation of our
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scheme and result of performance measurements, which indicates
a significant reduction on computing resources imposed on users.
Index Terms—Attribute-based encryption, outsourced decryp-
tion, verifiability.
I. INTRODUCTION
I N distributed settings with untrusted servers, such as thecloud, many applications need mechanisms for complex
access-control over encrypted data. Sahai and Waters [1] ad-
dressed this issue by introducing the notion of attribute-based
encryption (ABE). ABE is a new public key based one-to-many
encryption that enables access control over encrypted data using
access policies and ascribed attributes associated with private
keys and ciphertexts. There are two kinds of ABE schemes:
key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) [2]–[7] and ciphertext-policy ABE
(CP-ABE) [8], [9], [5], [6]. In a CP-ABE scheme, every cipher-
text is associated with an access policy on attributes, and every
user’s private key is associated with a set of attributes. A user
is able to decrypt a ciphertext only if the set of attributes as-
sociated with the user’s private key satisfies the access policy
associated with the ciphertext. In a KP-ABE scheme, the roles
of an attribute set and an access policy are swapped from what
we described for CP-ABE: attributes sets are used to annotate
the ciphertexts and access polices over these attributes are asso-
ciated with users’ private keys. In the following, we will use
the terms access policy, access structure and access formula
interchangeably.
One of the main efficiency drawbacks of the most existing
ABE schemes is that decryption is expensive for resource-lim-
ited devices due to pairing operations, and the number of pairing
operations required to decrypt a ciphertext grows with the com-
plexity of the access policy. At the cost of security, only proven
in a weak model (i.e., selective security), there exist several
expressive ABE schemes [10], [11] where the decryption al-
gorithm only requires a constant number of pairing computa-
tions. Recently, Green et al. [12] proposed a remedy to this
problem by introducing the notion of ABE with outsourced de-
cryption, which largely eliminates the decryption overhead for
users. Based on the existing ABE schemes, Green et al. [12] also
presented concrete ABE schemes with outsourced decryption.
In these schemes (refer to Fig. 1 below), a user provides an un-
trusted server, say a proxy operated by a cloud service provider,
with a transformation key TK that allows the latter to translate
any ABE ciphertext CT satisfied by that user’s attributes or ac-
cess policy into a simple ciphertext CT’, and it only incurs a
small overhead for the user to recover the plaintext from the
1556-6013/$31.00 © 2013 IEEE
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Fig. 1. ABE system with outsourced decryption.
transformed ciphertext CT’. The security property of the ABE
scheme with outsourced decryption guarantees that an adver-
sary (including the malicious cloud server) be not able to learn
anything about the encrypted message; however, the scheme
provides no guarantee on the correctness of the transformation
done by the cloud server. In the cloud computing setting, cloud
service providers may have strong financial incentives to return
incorrect answers, if such answers require less work and are un-
likely to be detected by users.
Consider a cloud based electronic medical record system
in which patients’ medical records are protected using ABE
schemes with outsourced decryption (e.g., [12]) and are stored
in the cloud. In order to efficiently access patients’ medical
records on her mobile phone, a doctor generates and delegates
a transformation key to a proxy in the cloud for outsourced
decryption; Given a transformed ciphertext from the proxy, the
doctor can read a patient’s medical record by just performing a
simple step of computation. If no verification of the correctness
of the transformation is guaranteed, however, the system might
run into the following two problems: 1) for the purpose of
saving computing cost, the proxy could return a medical record
transformed previously for the same doctor; 2) due to system
malfunction or malicious attack, the proxy could send the
medical record of another patient or a file of the correct form
but carrying wrong information. The consequence of treating
the patient based on incorrect information could be very serious
or even catastrophic.
The above observation motivates us to study ABE with veri-
fiable outsourced decryption in this paper.We emphasize that an
ABE scheme with secure outsourced decryption does not nec-
essarily guarantee verifiability (i.e., correctness of the transfor-
mation done by the cloud server). For example, the secure ABE
schemes with outsourced decryption proposed by Green et al.
in [12] are not verifiable, as we will show in Section III.
A. Our Contributions
In [12], Green et al. also considered the verifiability of the
cloud’s transformation and provided a method to check the cor-
rectness of the transformation. However, the authors did not
formally define verifiability. In fact, as we will demonstrate in
Section III, it is not feasible to construct ABE schemes with
verifiable outsourced decryption following the model defined in
[12]. Moreover, the method proposed in [12] relies on random
oracles (RO) [13]. Unfortunately, the ROmodel is heuristic, and
a proof of security in the ROmodel does not directly imply any-
thing about the security of an ABE scheme in the real world. It
is well known that there exist cryptographic schemes which are
secure in the ROmodel but are inherently insecure when the RO
is instantiated with any real hash function [14]–[17].
In this paper, we first modify the original model of ABE
with outsourced decryption in [12] to allow for verifiability of
the transformations. After describing the formal definition of
verifiability, we propose a new ABE model and based on this
new model construct a concrete ABE scheme with verifiable
outsourced decryption. Our scheme does not rely on random
oracles.
During the rest of the paper, we only focus on CP-ABE with
verifiable outsourced decryption. The same approach applies to
KP-ABE with verifiable outsourced decryption, which we will
omit here in order to keep the paper compact.
To assess the performance of our ABE scheme with verifi-
able outsourced decryption, we implement the CP-ABE scheme
with verifiable outsourced decryption and conduct experiments
on both anARM-basedmobile device and an Intel-core personal
computer to model a mobile user and a proxy, respectively. Our
software is based on the CP-ABE implementation in the libfenc
[18] library. Through the experiments, we find that it takes al-
most 50 seconds for the mobile device to execute a standard
decryption on ABE ciphertext with policy consisting of 100 at-
tributes. On the other hand, the Intel processor takes less than
5 seconds to decrypt the same ABE ciphertext. With the out-
sourced decryption, we shift this burdensome task from the mo-
bile device to the proxy, which results in a significant reduction
on computing cost for the mobile device. As a consequence, de-
crypting the ciphertext took approximately 180 milliseconds on
the ARM-based device.
B. Related Work
In this subsection, we review some closely related works, in-
cluding noninteractive verifiable computation, pairing delega-
tion and proxy reencryption.
Noninteractive Verifiable Computation: Noninteractive ver-
ifiable computation [19], [20] enables a computationally weak
client to outsource the computation of a function to one or more
workers. The workers return the result of the function evalu-
ation as well as a noninteractive proof that the computation of
the function was carried out correctly. Since these schemes [19],
[20] deal with outsourcing of general computation problems and
preserve the privacy of input data, they can be used to outsource
decryption in ABE systems. However, the schemes proposed in
[19], [20] use Gentry’s fully homomorphic encryption system
[21] as a building block, and thus the overhead in these schemes
is currently too large to be practical [22]. Recently, Parno et al.
[23] establish an important connection between verifiable com-
putation and ABE. They show how to construct a verifiable
computation scheme with public delegation and public verifia-
bility from any ABE scheme and how to construct a multifunc-
tion verifiable computation scheme from the ABE scheme with
outsourced decryption presented in [12]. Goldwasser et al. [24]
propose a succinct functional encryption scheme for general
functions, and show that, by replacing the ABE scheme used
in [23] with their succinct functional encryption scheme, one
can obtain a delegation scheme with is both publicly verifiable
and secret, in the sense that the prover does not learn anything
about the input or output of the function being delegated. All
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these schemes [19], [20], [23], [24] focus on delegating general
functions, and are not sufficiently efficient for the problem at
hand.
Pairing Delegation: Pairing delegation [25], [26] enables a
client to outsource the computation of parings to another entity.
However, the schemes proposed in [25], [26] still require the
client to compute multiple exponentiations in the target group
for every pairing it outsources. Most importantly, when using
paring delegation in the decryption of ABE ciphertexts, the
amount of computation of the client is still proportional to
the size of the access policy. Tsang et al. [27] consider batch
pairing delegation. However, the scheme proposed in [27] can
only handle batch delegation for pairings in which one of the
points is a constant and it still requires the client to compute a
pairing.
Proxy Reencryption: In ABE with outsourced decryption, a
user provides the cloud with a transformation key that allows
the cloud to translate an ABE ciphertext on message into
a simple ciphertext on the same , without learning anything
about . This is reminiscent of the concept of proxy reencryp-
tion [28], [29]. Proxy reencryption allows a proxy, using a reen-
cryption key, to transform an encryption of under Alice’s
public key into an encryption of the same under Bob’s public
key without the proxy learning anything about the encrypted
message . We emphasize that in the model of proxy reen-
cryption, verifiability of the proxy’s transformation cannot be
achieved. This can be briefly explained as follows. A proxy
could replace the encryption of under Alice’s public key with
the encryption of another message under Alice’s public key
and then use its reencryption key to transform the latter into an
encryption of under Bob’s public key. Obviously, without in-
teraction with Alice, Bob cannot detect this malicious behavior
of the proxy.
C. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
review some standard notations and cryptographic definitions.
In Section III, we describe our new model of CP-ABE with
verifiable outsourced decryption. We present a new CP-ABE
scheme with verifiable outsourced decryption and its security
analysis in Section IV. Section V shows the experimental re-
sults on the performance of our proposed scheme. Finally, we
state our conclusion in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
If is a set, then denotes the operation of picking
an element uniformly at random from . Let denote the
set of natural numbers. If then denotes the string of
ones. Let denote the operation of running
an algorithm with inputs and output . A function
is negligible if for every there exists a such that
for all .
A. Bilinear Groups
Let be an algorithm that takes as input a security parameter
and outputs a tuple , where and are multi-
plicative cyclic groups of prime order , and
is a map such that:
1) Bilinearity: for all and
.
2) Nondegeneracy: whenever .
3) Computable: efficient computability for any input pair.
We refer to the tuple as a bilinear group.
B. Complexity Assumptions
We state below the complexity assumption to be used in the
paper.
a) Discrete Logarithm (DL) Assumption: Let
be a prime order bilinear group system. Given
, where and are chosen
uniformly at random, the DL problem in
is to compute . The DL assumption in the prime order
bilinear group system is that no probabilistic
polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm can solve the DL problem
with nonnegligible advantage. The advantage of is defined as
where the probability is over the randomly chosen and the
random bits consumed by .
C. Access Structures
Definition 1 (Access Structure [30]): Let be
a set of parties. A collection is monotone
for and , if , then . An access
structure (respectively, monotone access structure) is a collec-
tion (respectively, monotone collection) of nonempty subsets
of , i.e., . The sets in are
called authorized sets, and the sets not in are called unautho-
rized sets.
In our context, attributes play the role of parties and we re-
strict our attention to monotone access structures. It is possible
to (inefficiently) realize general access structures using our tech-
niques by treating the negation of an attribute as a separate
attribute.
D. Linear Secret Sharing Schemes
Our construction will employ linear secret-sharing schemes.
We use the definition adapted from [30].
Definition 2 (Linear Secret-Sharing Schemes (LSSS)): A se-
cret sharing scheme over a set of parties is called linear
(over ) if
1) The shares for each party form a vector over .
2) There exists a matrix with rows and columns called
the share-generating matrix for . For all , the
th row of is labeled by a party ( is a function from
to ). When we consider the column vector
, where is the secret to be
shared, and are randomly chosen, then
is the vector of shares of the secret according to .
The share belongs to party .
It is shown in [30] that every linear secret-sharing scheme ac-
cording to the above definition also enjoys the linear reconstruc-
tion property, defined as follows. Suppose that is an LSSS for
the access structure . Let be any authorized set, and let
be defined as . Then there
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exist constants such that, if are valid shares
of any secret according to , then . Let
denotes the th row of , we have .
These constants can be found in time polynomial in the
size of the share-generation matrix [30]. Note that, for unau-
thorized sets, no such constants exist.
Boolean Formulas Access structures might also be described
in terms of monotonic boolean formulas. Using standard tech-
niques one can convert any monotonic boolean formula into an
LSSS representation. We can represent the boolean formula as
an access tree. An access tree of nodes will result in an LSSS
matrix of rows. We refer the reader to the Appendix of [31]
for a discussion on how to perform this conversion.
E. CP-ABE
ACP-ABE scheme consists of the following four algorithms:
• takes as input a security parameter and an
attribute universe description . It outputs the public pa-
rameters and a master secret key .
• takes as input the public parameters
, the master secret key and a set of attributes . It
outputs a private key .
• takes as input the public parameters
, a message and an access structure . It outputs a
ciphertext .
• takes as input the public parame-
ters , a private key for and a ciphertext . It
outputs a message .
Let
. For correctness, we require the
following to hold:
1) If the set of attributes satisfies the access structure ,
then ;
2) Otherwise, outputs the error
symbol .
We now give the definition of indistinguishability under chosen-
ciphertext attack (CCA security) for CP-ABE scheme. This is
described by a game between a challenger and an adversary .
The game proceeds as follows:
• The challenger runs algorithm to obtain the
public parameters and a master secret key . It
gives the public parameters to the adversary and
keeps to itself.
• The challenger initializes an empty set .
The adversary adaptively issues queries:
1) Private key query, on input a set of attributes : The
challenger runs and
sets . It then returns to the adversary
the private key .
2) Decryption query, on a set of attributes and a cipher-
text : The challenger runs
and . It then
returns to the adversary.
• The adversary submits two (equal length)
messages and an access structure , subject to
the restriction that, for all cannot be satisfied
by . The challenger selects a random bit , sets
and sends to the ad-
versary as its challenge ciphertext.
• The adversary continues to adaptively
issue Private key and Decryption queries, as in Query
phase 1, but with the restrictions that the adversary cannot
1) issue a Private key query that would result in a set
of attributes which satisfies the access structure
being added to .
2) issue a Decryption query on a set of attributes and
a ciphertext such that satisfies and
.
• The adversary outputs its guess for
and wins the game if .
The advantage of the adversary in this game is defined as
where the probability is taken over the
random bits used by the challenger and the adversary.
Definition 3: A CP-ABE scheme is CCA-secure if all poly-
nomial time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in
this security game.
CPA Security: We say that a CP-ABE scheme is CPA-se-
cure (or secure against chosen-plaintext attacks) if the adversary
cannot make decryption queries.
Selective Security: We say that a CP-ABE scheme is selec-
tively secure if we add an Init stage before Setup where the
adversary commits to the challenge access structure .
III. NEW MODEL OF CP-ABE WITH
OUTSOURCED DECRYPTION
In the original model defined in [12], a CP-ABE scheme
with outsourced decryption consists of five algorithms:
and . A trusted
party uses the algorithm to generate the public parame-
ters and a master secret key, and uses to generate
a private key and a transformation key for a user. Taking as
input the transformation key given by a user and a ciphertext,
the cloud can use the algorithm to transform the
ciphertext into a simple ciphertext if the user’s attribute satisfies
the access structure associated with the ciphertext; then the user
uses the algorithm to recover the plaintext from the
transformed ciphertext. Note that in the definition of Green et
al. [12], the input to the algorithm includes only the
private key of the user and the transformed ciphertext, but does
not include the original ciphertext. Because of this omission of
the original ciphertext, it is not possible to construct a CP-ABE
scheme with verifiable outsourced decryption under the defi-
nition of [12]. This can be explained as follows. A malicious
cloud could replace the ciphertext it supposes to transform
with a ciphertext of a different message, and then transform
the latter into a simple ciphertext using its transformation key.
Obviously, the user cannot detect this malicious behavior of
the cloud since the input to the algorithm does not
include the original ciphertext required to be transformed. In
order to achieve verifiability, we need to modify the model of
CP-ABE with outsourced decryption defined in [12]. We now
formally describe our new model.
A CP-ABE scheme with outsourced decryption consists of
the following seven algorithms:
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• takes as input a security parameter and at-
tribute universe description . It outputs the public param-
eters and a master secret key .
• takes as input the public parameters
, the master secret key and a set of attributes . It
outputs a private key .
• takes as input the public parameters
, a message and an access structure . It outputs a
ciphertext .
• takes as input the public parame-
ters , a private key for and a ciphertext . It
outputs a message .
• takes as input the public parameters
and a private key for . It outputs a transformation
key and the corresponding retrieving key .
• takes as input the public pa-
rameters , a ciphertext and a transformation key
for . It outputs a partially decrypted ciphertext .
• takes as input the public
parameters , a ciphertext , a partially decrypted ci-
phertext and a retrieving key for . It outputs a
message .
Let
and
. For correctness, we
require the following to hold:
1) If the set of attributes satisfies the access struc-
ture , then and
;
2) Otherwise, and
output the error
symbol .
In our new model, the algorithms and
constitute a traditional CP-ABE scheme. The input to
the algorithm includes the original ciphertext and
the transformed ciphertext. In fact, in our concrete scheme, a
user only needs to know a small part of the original ciphertext
to verify the correctness of the transformation done by the cloud
in the algorithm . In addition, in our model, using
the algorithm and his private key, the user generates
the transformation key by himself, not by the trusted party as
in [12]. Having either the trusted party or the user generate the
transformation key does not have an effect on the security of
the scheme. However, it is more flexible if we let the user him-
self generate the transformation key. Imagine that a user doesn’t
know whether he will outsource decryption of his stored files
or not in the future. At the setup stage of our proposed ABE
with verifiable outsourced decryption system, the user can just
initialize an ordinary ABE system without outsourced decryp-
tion. Then, the user can generate the transformation key himself
whenever he wants to outsource decryption, without having to
resetup of the whole system. On the other hand, if the trusted
party is responsible for the generation of transformation keys,
the user is required to reinitialize the system for outsourced
decryption.
Now, we formally describe the security and verifiability re-
quirements of a CP-ABE scheme with outsourced decryption.
Informally, security ensures that an adversary (including a ma-
licious cloud) not be able to learn anything about the encrypted
message and verifiability allows a user to check on the correct-
ness of the transformation done by the cloud.
Security. Since the traditional notion of security against adap-
tive chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA) does not allow any bit of
the ciphertext to be altered, similar to [12], we adopt a relaxation
due to Canetti et al. [32] called replayable CCA (RCCA) secu-
rity, which allows modifications to the ciphertext provided they
cannot change the underlyingmessage in ameaningful way. The
RCCA security for CP-ABE with outsourced decryption is de-
scribed as a game between a challenger and an adversary. The
RCCA security game proceeds as follows:
• The challenger runs algorithm to obtain the
public parameters and a master secret key . It
gives the public parameters to the adversary and
keeps to itself.
• The challenger initializes an empty table
and an empty set . The adversary adaptively issues
queries:
1) Private key query, on input a set of attributes : The
challenger runs and
sets . It then returns to the adversary
the private key .
2) Transformation key query, on input a set of at-
tributes : The challenger searches the entry
in table . If such entry ex-
ists, it returns the transformation key . Oth-
erwise, it runs
and stores in
table the entry . It then returns
to the adversary the transformation key .
Without of loss of generality, we assume that an adver-
sary do not issue Transformation key query on a set of
attributes , if it has already issued a Private key query
on the same set of attributes . Since anyone can by
himself generate a transformation key for a user using
the algorithm and the user’s private key, our
assumption is reasonable.
3) Decryption query, on input a set of attributes
and a ciphertext : The challenger runs
and
. It then returns to the
adversary.
4) query, on input a set of attributes
and a pair of ciphertexts : The challenger
searches the entry in table . If
such entry exists, it runs
and returns to the adversary ; otherwise,
it returns .
• The adversary submits two (equal length)
messages and an access structure , subject to the
restriction that, for all cannot be satisfied by
. The challenger selects a random bit , sets
and sends to the ad-
versary as its challenge ciphertext.
• The adversary continues to adaptively
issue Private key, Transformation key, Decryption and
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queries, as in Query phase 1, but with the
restrictions that the adversary cannot
1) issue a Private key query that would result in a set of
attributes which satisfies the access structure being
added to .
2) issue a trivial decryption query. That is, Decryption
and queries will be answered as in
Query phase 1, except that if the response would be ei-
ther or , then the challenger responds with the
error symbol .
• The adversary outputs its guess for
and wins the game if .
The advantage of the adversary in this game is defined as
where the probability is taken over the
random bits used by the challenger and the adversary.
Definition 4: A CP-ABE scheme with outsourced decryption
is RCCA-secure if all polynomial time adversaries have at most
a negligible advantage in this security game.
CPA Security: We say that a CP-ABE scheme with
outsourced decryption is CPA-secure (or secure against
chosen-plaintext attacks) if the adversary cannot make decryp-
tion queries.
Selective Security: We say that a CP-ABE scheme with out-
sourced decryption is selectively secure if we add an Init stage
before Setup where the adversary commits to the challenge ac-
cess structure .
Verifiability. Verifiability of CP-ABE with outsourced decryp-
tion is also described by a game between a challenger and an
adversary. The game proceeds as follows:
• The challenger runs algorithm to obtain the
public parameters and a master secret key . It
gives the public parameters to the adversary and
keeps to itself.
• The challenger initializes an empty table
. The adversary adaptively issues queries:
1) Private key query, on input a set of attributes : The
challenger runs and
returns to the adversary the private key .
2) Transformation key query, on input a set of at-
tributes : The challenger runs
and
stores in table the entry . It
then returns to the adversary the transformation key
.
Without of loss of generality, we assume that an ad-
versary does not issue Transformation key query on a
set of attributes , if it has already issued a Private
key query on the same set of attributes . Since anyone
can by himself generate a transformation key for a user
using the algorithm and the user’s private
key, our assumption is reasonable.
3) Decryption query, on input a set of attributes
and a ciphertext : The challenger runs
and
. It then returns to the ad-
versary .
4) query, on input a set of attributes
and a pair of ciphertexts : The challenger
searches the entry in table . If
such entry exists, it runs
and returns to the adversary; otherwise,
it returns .
• The adversary submits a message
and an access structure . The challenger sets
and sends to the
adversary.
• The adversary continues to adaptively
issue Private key, Transformation key, Decryption and
queries, as in Query phase 1.
• The adversary outputs a set of attributes
and a transformed ciphertext . We assume that entry
exists in table (If not, the
challenger can generate the entry as in the response of
Transformation key query). The adversary wins the game
if .
The advantage of the adversary in this game is defined as
where the probability is taken over the random bits
used by the challenger and the adversary.
Definition 5: A CP-ABE scheme with outsourced decryption
is verifiable if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a
negligible advantage in the above game.
One stronger notion of verifiability is that, even if the trusted
party who setups the system is malicious, a user still can check
on the correctness of the transformation done by the cloud. That
is, the adversary generates the system’s public parameters and
master secret key by himself in the above game. Nevertheless, it
is difficult to construct a CP-ABE scheme with outsourced de-
cryption which is verifiable in such stronger model, since most
existing techniques of provable security need to generate the
system’s public parameters elaborately by the challenger. This
challenging problem will be left as one of our future research
topics.
IV. PROPOSED CP-ABE SCHEME WITH VERIFIABLE
OUTSOURCED DECRYPTION
In this section, we first propose a new CP-ABE scheme uti-
lizing Waters’ CP-ABE scheme [4], which is proven to be se-
lectively CPA-secure. Then, based on the scheme, we propose
a CP-ABE scheme with outsourced decryption and prove that it
is selectively CPA-secure and verifiable in the standard model.
Recently, the first CP-ABE scheme that achieved full security
was proposed by Lewko et al. [5]. Since the underlying struc-
ture of the CP-ABE scheme presented by Lewko et al. [5] is al-
most identical to the underlyingWaters’ CP-ABE scheme [4] we
use, one can adapt our construction techniques to the CP-ABE
scheme proposed in [5] to achieve fully secure (i.e., RCCA se-
cure) CP-ABE scheme with verifiable outsourced decryption in
the standard model.
A. New CP-ABE Scheme
Before presenting our new CP-ABE scheme, we give some
intuitions of our construction. Based on Waters’ CP-ABE
scheme [4], we add to the ciphertext the encryption of an extra
random message and a checksum value, which is computed
with this random message and the actual plaintext. We regard
this checksum value as a commitment of the actual plaintext,
which can be used to check if the transformation is done
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correctly in our CP-ABE Scheme with verifiable outsourced
decryption. In fact, using our techniques, we can modify un-
bounded ABE schemes [7], [33] to unbounded ABE scheme
with verifiable outsourced decryption.
Our new CP-ABE scheme consists of the following
algorithms:
• The setup algorithm takes as input a
security parameter and a small universe descrip-
tion . It first runs to obtain
, where and are cyclic groups
of prime order . It then chooses ,
and uniformly at random. For each at-
tribute , it chooses a random value .
Finally, it chooses a collision-resistant hash function
. The public parameters are published as
.
The master secret key is .
• The key generation algorithm
randomly picks . The secret key
is computed as
.
• The encryption algorithm takes as
input the public parameters , a message to en-
crypt and an LSSS access structure , where is
an matrix and is a map from each row of to an
attribute . It chooses two random vectors ,
denoted and . For
each row of , it chooses uniformly at
random. Finally, it chooses a random message .
The ciphertext is
, where
• The decryption algorithm takes as
input the public parameters , a private key
for a set of attributes and a ciphertext
for an access structure . If does not satisfy the
access structure , it outputs . Suppose that satisfies
the access structure and let be defined as
. It computes constant such
that . The decryption algorithm
then computes:
If , it outputs the message ; other-
wise, it outputs .
Obviously, the above CP-ABE scheme satisfies correctness. Ob-
serve that, in our construction, a ciphertext includes three parts:
and . The first and
second parts are encryptions of message and a random mes-
sage , respectively, using the encryption algorithm ofWaters’
CP-ABE scheme [4]. In fact, the second and third parts are re-
dundant. However, the redundant parts are the point that we can
construct a CP-ABE with verifiable outsourced decryption from
the above CP-ABE scheme.
Theorem 1: Suppose that the construction of Waters [4] is a
selectively CPA-secure CP-ABE scheme, then the above con-
struction of CP-ABE scheme is also selectively CPA-secure.
Proof: To prove the selective CPA security of our CP-ABE
scheme, we consider the following two games.
• The original selectively CPA-secure game of
CP-ABE.
• Same as except for the way that the
challenger generates the challenge ciphertext
, where
the challenger picks randomly and the rest parts
of the challenge ciphertext are generated properly as in
.
We prove this theorem by the following two lemmas. Lemma 1
states that and are indistinguishable; and Lemma
2 states that the advantage of the adversary in is negli-
gible. Therefore, we conclude that the advantage of the adver-
sary in (i.e., the original selectively CPA-secure game)
is negligible. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1: Suppose that the construction of Waters [4] is a
selectively CPA-secure CP-ABE scheme, and
are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof: Suppose there exists an adversary that can
distinguish and with nonnegligible advantage.
We build an algorithm that can attack the Waters’ CP-ABE
scheme [4] in the selectively CPA-secure model with nonnegli-
gible advantage.
Let be the challenger corresponding to in the selectively
CPA-secure game of Waters’ CP-ABE scheme. runs exe-
cuting the following steps.
• The adversary gives its challenge access
structure . sends to as its challenge ac-
cess structure and is given the public parameters
of
the Waters’ CP-ABE scheme.
• chooses random exponents and sets
, and . also chooses a colli-
sion-resistant hash function . Then, sends
the public parameters
to the adversary .
• When the adversary adaptively issues a
private key query for a set of attributes calls the key
generation oracle of on to obtain the private key .
Then, returns to the private key .
• The adversary submits two (equal length)
messages . chooses a random bit
and two random messages . Then, sends
and to . selects a random bit ,
encrypts the message under and using the
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encryption algorithm of Waters’ CP-ABE scheme, and
sends the resulting ciphertext to . parses
as . Then, chooses
a random vector , denoted .
For each row of chooses uniformly at
random. Finally, sets
and sends
to as its challenge ciphertext.
• continues to adaptively issue private key
queries as in Query phase 1, and responds the queries as
in Query phase 1.
• outputs its guess for . also outputs
as its guess for .
Observe that, if , then has properly simulated ;
otherwise, has properly simulated . Thus, if can dis-
tinguish and with nonnegligible advantage, we
can build an algorithm that attacks the selectively CPA-secure
Waters’ CP-ABE scheme [4] with nonnegligible advantage.
Lemma 2: Suppose that the construction of Waters [4] is a
selectively CPA-secure CP-ABE scheme, the advantage of the
adversary in is negligible.
Proof: Suppose there exists an adversary that has a non-
negligible advantage in . We build an algorithm that
can attack the Waters’ CP-ABE scheme [4] in the selectively
CPA-secure model with a nonnegligible advantage.
Let be the challenger corresponding to in the selectively
CPA-secure game of Waters’ CP-ABE scheme. runs exe-
cuting the following steps.
• The adversary gives its challenge access
structure . sends to as its challenge ac-
cess structure and is given the public parameters
of
the Waters’ CP-ABE scheme.
• chooses random exponents and sets
, and . also chooses a colli-
sion-resistant hash function . Then, sends
the public parameters
to the adversary .
• When the adversary adaptively issues a
private key query for a set of attributes calls the key
generation oracle of on to obtain the private key .
Then, returns to the private key .
• The adversary submits two (equal length)
messages . sends and to . selects
a random bit , encrypts the message under
and using the encryption algorithm of Waters’
CP-ABE scheme, and sends the resulting ciphertext
to . parses as .
Then, chooses a random message and a
random vector , denoted .
For each row of chooses uniformly at
random. Finally, chooses a random element in
and sets
and sends
to as its challenge ciphertext.
• continues to adaptively issue private key
queries as in Query phase 1, and responds the queries as
in Query phase 1.
• outputs a bit . also takes as its output.
Obviously, has properly simulated in . Thus, if has
a nonnegligible advantage in , then attacks the selec-
tively CPA-secure Waters’ CP-ABE scheme [4] with a nonneg-
ligible advantage.
B. Our CP-ABE Scheme With Verifiable Outsourced
Decryption
For notational purposes in the below, we denote the above
CP-ABE scheme as . Based on ,
we present a CP-ABE scheme with verifiable outsourced de-
cryption. The and algorithms
operate exactly as in . We now describe the re-
maining algorithms:
• This algorithm takes as input
the public parameters and a private key
for a set of attributes . It chooses a
random value . Then, it sets the transformation key
as
and the retrieving key as . Note that, with over-
whelming probability, has multiplicative inverse.
• This algorithm takes as
input the public parameters , a ciphertext
for an
access structure , and a transformation key
for a set of attributes . It then
computes:
and outputs the transformed ciphertext as
.
• This algorithm takes
as input the public parameters , a ciphertext
,
a transformed ciphertext and a
retrieving key for a set of attributes . If
or or , it outputs . Then, it computes
and . If ,
it outputs the message ; otherwise, it outputs .
Obviously, the above CP-ABE scheme with outsourced decryp-
tion satisfies correctness. In the above construction, a user runs
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the algorithm to recover the plaintext from the trans-
formed ciphertext and computation cost incurred by the user is
about three exponentiations, which is far less than the cost of
running the algorithm to recover the plaintext from the
original ciphertext directly. The input of algorithm
includes the original ciphertext
and the trans-
formed ciphertext. In fact, the user only needs to know to
verify the correctness of the transformation done by the cloud.
Theorem 2: Assume that is selectively CPA-
secure. Then the above construction of CP-ABE scheme with
outsourced decryption is selectively CPA-secure.
Proof: Suppose there exists an adversary that can attack
the above CP-ABE scheme with outsourced decryption in the
selectively CPA-secure model with nonnegligible advantage.
We build an algorithm that can attack the CP-ABE scheme
in the selectively CPA-secure model with non-
negligible advantage.
Let be the challenger corresponding to in the selectively
CPA-secure game of the CP-ABE scheme .
runs to execute the following steps.
• The adversary gives its challenge access
structure . sends to as its challenge access
structure and is given the public parameters
of
.
• sends the public parameters to the adversary
.
• initializes an empty table and an empty
set . The adversary adaptively issues queries:
1) Private key query for a set of attributes : calls the
key generation oracle of on to obtain the private
key . Then, sets and returns to
the private key .
2) Transformation key query for a set of attributes :
searches the entry in table .
If such entry exists, it returns the transformation key
. Otherwise, chooses random exponents
. Then, sets
Finally, stores in table the entry
and returns to the transforma-
tion key . Note that, does not know the actual
retrieving key .
• The adversary submits two (equal length)
messages and an access structure . sends
and to to obtain the challenge ciphertext
. Then, sends to the adversary as its chal-
lenge ciphertext.
• continues to adaptively issue private key
queries as in Query phase 1, and responds the queries as
in Query phase 1.
• The adversary outputs a bit . also outputs .
So, we build an algorithm that can attack
in the selectively CPA-secure model with nonnegligible advan-
tage, if can attack the above CP-ABE schemewith outsourced
decryption in the selectively CPA-secure model with nonnegli-
gible advantage.
Theorem 3: Suppose that the DL assumption holds in the
prime order bilinear group system. Then the above construction
of CP-ABE scheme with outsourced decryption is verifiable.
Proof: Suppose there exists an adversary that can at-
tack the verifiability of the above CP-ABE scheme with out-
sourced decryption with nonnegligible advantage. We build an
algorithm that can solve the DL problem in the prime order
bilinear group system with nonnegligible advantage.
is given and runs executing the fol-
lowing steps.
• chooses uniformly at random.
For each attribute chooses a random value
. also chooses a collision-resistant hash
function . Then, sets the public param-
eters as
. The master secret key is
. Finally, sends the public parameters to
the adversary .
• The adversary adaptively issues Private
key, Transformation Key, Decryption and
queries. Since knows the master secret key , it can
answers the adversary’s queries properly.
• The adversary submits a messages and an
access structure . sets
and sends to . Let
, where
and is chosen by
randomly.
• continues to adaptively issue private key
queries as in Query phase 1, and responds the queries as
in Query phase 1.
• The adversary outputs a set of attributes and
a transformed ciphertext .
computes and , where ,
known by , is the retrieving key for the attributes set . If the
adversary wins the above game, then can obtain
where and are known by
. Since is a collision-resistant hash function, with over-
whelming probability, is not equal to . Then,
outputs as the solution of the DL problem
.
V. PERFORMANCE
In order to evaluate the performance of our CP-ABE scheme
with verifiable outsourced decryption presented in Section IV,
we implement our scheme in software based on the libfenc
library [18] and using a 224-bit MNT elliptic curve from the
Stanford Pairing-Based Crypto library [34]. Although our
implementation based the MNT curve implies the use of asym-
metric pairing, only a small change need to be made on our
scheme of symmetric setting in the implementation. Specif-
ically, suppose that an asymmetric pairing takes elements
from and as inputs. Then, according to the description
of our scheme in Section IV, we generate two ’s, one from
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Fig. 2. Performance of our CP-ABE scheme with verifiable outsourced decryption.
and another from , and compute two corresponding
’s. We further set as group elements in . As a
consequence, among the ciphertext and private key compo-
nents, are group elements in while
are group elements in . The reason why
we implement our proposed scheme using asymmetric pairing
is that: compared to symmetric pairings, asymmetric pairings
are much faster and more compact to implement [35]–[37].
We compile our code on two dedicated hardware platforms: a
2.53 GHz Intel Core CPU with 4 GB of RAM running 32-bit
Linux Kernel version 2.6.32, and a 800 MHz ARM-based Sam-
sung GT-S5830 with 278 MB of RAM running Android OS.
As in [18], our implementation adopts the key encapsulation
mechanism, where the ABE ciphertext is the encryption of a
symmetric key and the message is encrypted separately using
a symmetric encryption scheme under this . The symmetric
key is computed as , and we omit the components
and in the ABE cipher-
text. Note that in our scheme presented in Section IV, the veri-
fication step involves and , while in our implementation,
we use the two hash values of and , instead.
These modifications reduce the sizes of the ABE ciphertext and
the partially-decrypted ciphertext by two elements in , re-
spectively, without sacrificing security and verifiability.
Experimental Setup: In a CP-ABE scheme, the complexity
of ciphertext policy impacts both the decryption time and the
ciphertext size. To illustrate this, we generate ciphertext poli-
cies in the form of ( and and and ) (i.e., the worst
situation over the policy), where each is an attribute. This ap-
proach ensures that all the ciphertext components are involved
the decryption computation. We generate 100 distinct policies
in this form with increasing from 1 to 100. In each case, we
construct a corresponding standard decryption key that contains
exact attributes.
In our experiments, we do not consider the effect of sym-
metric encryption. Thus, all the datum on decryption time and
ciphertext size presented in Fig. 2 are only associated with the
key encapsulation variant of our ABE scheme. For each cipher-
text policy, we repeat our experiment 100 times on the PC and
30 times on the ARM device and we take the average values as
the experimental results. In Fig. 2, we show the size of standard
ABE ciphertext and partially-decrypted ciphertext, the standard
ABE decryption time on the Intel and the ARM platforms, the
time of generating an outsourcing key, the time of transforming
the ABE ciphertext, and the time of decrypting the transformed
ciphertext on the Intel and the ARM platforms.
Discussion: The ABE ciphertext size and decryption/trans-
formation time increase linearly as the ciphertext policy’s com-
plexity grows. An encryption under a ciphertext policy with
100 attributes results in an ABE ciphertext of nearly 46 KB and
it takes about 5 seconds for the Intel platform to decrypt this
ciphertext. On the other hand, decryption time degrades consid-
erably on the ARM platform: it requires more than 1 second to
decrypt a ciphertext under a policy with one attribute, 5 seconds
under a policy with ten attributes and almost 50 seconds under
a policy with one hundred attributes.
As expected, outsourcing substantially reduces the computa-
tion time required for devices with limited computing resource
to recover the plaintext. The bulk of the decryption operation
is now handled by the proxy. The transformed ciphertext is not
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only much efficient to decrypt but also much smaller in size. In
our implementation, each partially-decrypted ciphertext has a
constant size of 392 bytes, regardless the complexity of its cor-
responding ciphertext policy. The final decryption and verifica-
tion of the transformed ciphertext requires only 13 milliseconds
on the Intel platform and approximately 180 milliseconds on the
ARM platform.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered a new requirement of ABE with
outsourced decryption: verifiability. We modified the original
model of ABE with outsourced decryption proposed by Green
et al. [12] to include verifiability. We also proposed a concrete
ABE scheme with verifiable outsourced decryption and proved
that it is secure and verifiable. Our scheme does not rely on
random oracles. To assess the practicability of our scheme, we
implemented it and conducted experiments in a simulated out-
sourcing environment. As expected, the scheme substantially
reduced the computation time required for resource-limited de-
vices to recover plaintexts.
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